Losing Hearts and Minds
Understanding America's Failure in Iraq
By Samer Shehata
Although the future of Iraq remains uncertain, the United
States has already lost the war for Iraqi hearts and minds. The
war of diplomacy was lost not because of biased reporting in
the Arab media or the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, but primarily
because of a series of policy mistakes, broken promises,
and the failure to meet basic obligations. Nearly two years after
the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, significant parts of Iraq
remain entrenched in a Hobbesian nightmare. In addition to
the absence of law and order, basic services have only recently
reached prewar levels in much of the country. In Tikrit,
Fallujah, and Baghdad, cities favored under the previous
regime, residents have less electricity and clean water than they
did before the war.
No amount of refurbished schools, democracy programs,
or good intentions can compensate for these conditions,
which many blame—rightly or wrongly—on the United States
and the now defunct Coalitional Provisional Authority (CPA).
By faulting the old regime, the condition of the country’s
infrastructure before the war, or the continuing violence, the
United States is unlikely to win the sympathy of ordinary
Iraqis. Even if elections in January 2005 are “successful,” it is
unlikely that this will be sufficient to convince Iraqis that
America is trustworthy and deserving of their support.
The future will likely bring intensified
counterinsurgency operations, increased
urban fighting, corresponding resistance,
and inevitable civilian casualties,
that will further embitter Iraqis. From
the perspective of most citizens, the
United States and the CPA received failing
grades long ago.
What mistakes did the United States
and the CPA make that resulted in the
present state of affairs? What do Iraqis
think of the current situation, the coalition
forces, and the continued American
presence? And how will the continuing
violence likely impact Iraqi opinion of
the interim government and the United
States? Answering these questions is
essential for assessing the prospects for
Iraq’s future.
“Kites and Boom Boxes.” Those
who spoke before the war about Iraqis
welcoming American troops with “kites
and boom boxes,” such as Fouad Ajami,
a professor at Johns Hopkins University,
mischaracterized the situation. Kanan
Makiya, an Iraqi Professor at Brandeis
University, told President Bush during a
visit to the Oval Office that invading
American troops would be greeted with
“sweets and flowers.”1 This kind of polit
ically motivated misinformation coming
from experts was employed by adminis
tration officials to sell the war to the
American public.2
One of the many problems with such
naively optimistic predictions
is that they failed to
recognize the possibility
that Iraqis, while welcoming
the end of Saddam’s
regime, simultaneously
disdained the idea of for
eign troops in their
country. The course of
the occupation has only
made matters worse.
An Army War College
report, Reconstructing Iraq:
Insights, Challenges and Missions for Military Forces
in a Post-Conflict Scenario, presciently stated ,
“Long-term gratitude is unlikely and
suspicion of U.S. motives will increase as
the occupation continues. A force initially
viewed as liberators can rapidly be
relegated to the status of invaders should
an unwelcome occupation continue for a
prolonged time. Occupation problems
may be especially acute if the United
States must implement the bulk of the
occupation itself rather than turn these
duties over to a postwar international
force.”3