Facing Double Jeopardy:
Nuclear Proliferation and Terrorism
By Jon B Wolfsthal
As the world’s only superpower, the United States has a major
interest in reducing the spread and use of nuclear weapons.
Only nuclear weapons can strategically constrain U.S. action
overseas, and only nuclear weapons can realistically threaten
the fabric of American society. Alarmingly, given the conse
quences, the risk of a nuclear attack against the United States
is increasing. In the near term, this concern focuses mainly on
the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by terror groups,
particularly al-Qaeda. Traditional tools that have kept the
nuclear peace, such as deterrence, are of little or no value
against these terrorists. Therefore, the only hope for the
United States is to prevent such groups from acquiring nuclear
weapons. In the long term, the primary nuclear danger is a
possible new wave of state proliferation that engulfs the Middle
East and East Asia. As today’s international security is predicated
on the existence of few nuclear states, the spread of
nuclear weapons in these regions fundamentally challenges
U.S. security.
As disturbing as these realities are, the spread of nuclear
weapons is not inevitable, and more can—and must—be done
to prevent it from taking place. Throughout the nuclear age,
the United States has kept proliferation in check with aggressive, comprehensive, and focused policies.
In the past thirty years alone, U.S.
efforts have prevented and even rolled
back proliferation in at least eight states.
These successes have required the use of
incentives, alliances, diplomacy, and, at
times, sanctions.1 While not perfect, such
nonproliferation efforts have enjoyed a
positive track record.
But state proliferation is no longer the
international community’s primary con
cern, as the possibility of nuclear terror
ism has become its central focus.
Fortunately, nuclear terror is preventable.
Terror groups do not have the
capacity to produce their own nuclear
materials. They must therefore rely on
state nuclear stockpiles. The effective
prevention of nuclear terror requires the
cooperation of over fifty countries at a
cost of billions of dollars. Compared to
the economic, security, and political
consequences—to say nothing of the loss
of human lives—that would accompany
the first terrorist use of a nuclear
weapon, these efforts are vital.
Overall, international efforts to prevent
nuclear terrorism to date have been
slow, uncoordinated, and piecemeal
compared to what is required to win the
race against time, as described by both
International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) Director General Mohammed El
Baradei and former U.S. Senator Sam
Nunn. A combination of concerted
effort and luck has left the international
community fortunate, but few believe
that such fortune will hold out as time
progresses. Most believe more hard work
will be essential.
Double Jeopardy. The full extent of
the terrorist threat to the international
community is unknown. Yet enough evidence
exists of terrorist interest in
nuclear weapons to cause alarm. The
good news is that terrorists do not yet
possess the means to produce their own
enriched uranium or separated plutonium—
activities that require time and
large, complex facilities.2 Thus, groups
intent on acquiring nuclear weapons
must steal or buy such materials from
existing national stockpiles. The bad
news is that many hundreds of tons of
direct-use nuclear materials exist all over
the world and hundreds of tons—enough
for tens of thousands of nuclear
weapons—are vulnerable to theft or
diversion. Moreover, there is strong evidence
that terrorists affiliated with al-
Qaeda and others are actively seeking
these materials in Russia, Pakistan, and
elsewhere.3 Russian security officials have
reported that Chechen groups linked to
al-Qaeda have conducted surveillance of
Russian nuclear facilities. Russian offi
cials were sufficiently concerned in the
wake of the 2004 Beslan school attack
and dual airline bombings to order additional
Interior Ministry troops to protect
nuclear sites. Pakistani nuclear experts
are also believed to have met with top al-
Qaeda officials in 2001, possibly even
with Osama bin Laden himself.4
Moreover, there is continued concern
about the reliability of the security and
personnel associated with Pakistan’s
nuclear complex.