Blind Spot:
The United States and Post-Conflict Intervention
By Robert M. Perito
Iraq was not the first time the United States was unprepared for
post-intervention violence. Similar outbreaks of civilian violence
occurred during the initial stage of U.S. interventions in
Panama, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Given the importance of
properly managing post-conflict interventions, it is critical that
the United States find a solution to this problem. As one U.S.
Army colonel put it, "The U.S. cannot be unprepared for missions
it does not want, as if the lack of preparedness might prevent
our going. We cannot be like children that refuse to get
dressed for school."1 Why does the United States have a "blind
spot" that results in failure to plan for the lawlessness that follows
military intervention? First, there is a misunderstanding
of the nature of failed states. Second, the U.S. military is not
trained to deal with banditry and lawlessness and do not have
special police capabilities dedicated to establishing law and
order. Third, the U.S. government's civilian agencies are not
prepared to execute their missions as part of stability operations,
and it seems unlikely that a proper reorganization will
come about in the near future. If we are to undertake more stability
operations in the future, as seems likely, we need to modernize
our foreign policy architecture and security forces, which
remain essentially unchanged since the Cold War, and create a
civilian Stability Force to undertake civilian missions alongside military forces in stability operations.
The United States has neglected
to acknowledge the significant role of
criminal regimes in weak and failing states.
Somalia-the first state in which the
United States engaged in post-Cold War
UN peacekeeping-was an anomaly
because at the beginning of Operation
Restore Hope in December 1992, Somalia
was without a central government and in a
state of civil war. This was not true for the
other failed states where the United States
has intervened militarily: Panama, Haiti
(twice), Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan,
Liberia, and Iraq. While these countries
may have had characteristics of weak and
failing states, their ruling regimes actually
were "kleptocracies" in which the leaders
used corrupt intelligence and security services
to engage in narcotics trafficking,
money laundering, racketeering, and
other organized criminal enterprises.
Proceeds from illicit activities were used to
finance the ruling elites' lavish lifestyles
and to purchase the loyalty of the military
and police forces. For example, ex-
Yugoslavian president Slobodan
Milosevic, his family, and political supporters
profited handsomely from kickbacks
on exports of agriculture products
and raw materials.
Given that criminalized regimes were
in control of the countries where the
United States intervened militarily, it is
not surprising that looting, lawlessness,
widespread violence, and organized crime
have posed the principal challenges in
these stability operations.
Having misunderstood the fundamental
problem confronting the states where the
United States has intervened, namely the
persistence of criminal organizations, the
United States and the international community
have offered the wrong solutions.
Early elections and economic assistance
have legitimized and financed criminal
elements. Failures to rapidly establish
effective police, courts, and prisons and to
institute the rule of law have prolonged the
stay of U.S. intervention forces and stifled
democracy and economic prosperity.
Military
force has been the U.S. instrument of
choice for post-conflict interventions
because military forces are maintained in
a state of readiness for foreign deployment.
They can be transported rapidly
over great distances, are self-sufficient
upon arrival, and provide their own force
protection. The U.S. military can provide
protection against regular armies and
paramilitary forces, but it is not organized,
trained, and equipped to deal with
civil disturbances and engage in law
enforcement. In the words of the former
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe,
General Wesley Clark, "Experience in
peace operations has proven that good
soldiers, no matter how well equipped,
trained, and led, cannot perform police duties among civilian populations."3 In
interventions from Panama to Iraq, U.S.
forces were unprepared to control civilian
mobs that looted and destroyed critical infrastructure and dealt a crippling blow
to public perceptions of the intervention
force and any related peace process. The
U.S. military is simply not trained to conduct
such post-conflict activities.