Streamlining U.S. Democracy Assistance
By Don Pressley and Lawrence Groo
President George W. Bush started his second administration
with a strong pledge to support freedom around the world,
alongside a renewed push for U.S. public diplomacy in the
Middle East and elsewhere. His administration has backed this
commitment with a proposed $1.5 billion in U.S. democracy
assistance for developing countries for 2006. Democracy
assistance programs include rule of law promotion, legislative
strengthening, electoral assistance, and public administration
reform. While this level of assistance reflects the U.S. government's
clear commitment to fostering freedom and democracy,
there is an emerging consensus that U.S. democracy assistance
should more effectively address the common governance
and public management challenges found in fragile and transitioning
states.
As the recent elections in Iraq, Ukraine, and Afghanistan
demonstrate, U.S. assistance can have a real impact on the
process of democratization in developing countries. However,
free elections are only the beginning; lasting democratic governance
advances require significant long-term institutional
changes and behavioral adaptation. Committing to longerterm
governance reform can benefit both domestic and international
policy interests: there is growing recognition that
investing aggressively in good governance in fragile states can
reduce the chances of conflict or civil unrest, a finding recently highlighted by a high-level report
commissioned by British Prime Minister Tony Blair.
The growing strategic importance of
U.S. programs to both U.S. national
security interests and the development of
democracy around the globe has given
rise to discussion about the nature and
efficacy of the aid dispersed. In order to
justify the large sums of support provided
by the U.S. government, whether
through the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID)
and affiliated entities, or via U.S.-supported
multilateral organizations like the
World Bank and regional development
banks, such assistance needs to become
more tangibly effective.
More broadly, there is an active debate
in U.S. and international policy circles
about the relationship between democracy
promotion and economic growth,
and, similarly, whether improved state
institutions or economic policies are
more immediately supportive of sustainable
development and political stability.
Additionally, some question whether
democracy assistance programs should
focus on promoting more effective institutions
as an objective end, or as a means
to a further end whether, for example, to
concentrate on achieving accountable
government or the rule of law.
Though these policy debates are longstanding
and unlikely to be settled quickly,
one way to better inform the policy
formulation process is to examine more
closely the implementation of U.S.
democracy assistance and to gauge more
clearly the actual capacity of such assistance
to achieve specific results.
The object of this article is to define
better the practical limits of U.S. democracy
assistance from an implementation
standpoint, emphasizing democracy as a form of governance and distinguishing
between programs improving governance
systems and those targeting behavior
underlying governance systems. Noting
that improvements in governance systems
are relatively more easily documented
and measured than behavioral changes,
we recommend that U.S. policymakers
initially emphasize institutional systemsoriented
assistance, while further
researching and supporting various
approaches to longer-term behavioraloriented
change.